Optimal Indirect Tax Design for a Developing Country by OGAWA Yoshitomo & HOSOE Nobuhiro
  
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 18-06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal Indirect Tax Design for a Developing Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Yoshitomo Ogawa 
Nobuhiro Hosoe 
 
 
 
 
August 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
Optimal Indirect Tax Design for a Developing
Country∗
Yoshitomo Ogawa,† Nobuhiro Hosoe,‡
July 2018
Abstract
Given that tariﬀs continue to serve as a primary source of government rev-
enue in many developing countries, we analyze the optimal indirect tax prob-
lem, consisting of commodity taxes and tariﬀs, under a revenue constraint. This
study derives the revenue-constrained optimal commodity taxes and tariﬀs in
both a small and a large country and then examines their structure and prop-
erties. We show that the optimal commodity tax structure follows the Ramsey
rule regardless of whether a country is small or large, which implies that the
same optimal commodity tax rules are applied across a range of situations. We
also show that the optimal tariﬀs are not zero, but negative, even in the small
country case, which implies stronger support for the World Bank’s recommen-
dation of tariﬀ reductions for a country facing a revenue constraint. In addition,
this study analyzes the optimal commodity taxation when tariﬀs cannot be fully
adjusted. Numerical examples demonstrate some of our major findings and the
welfare gain of the optimal taxation for a few developing countries.
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1 Introduction
The reconciliation of the trade-oﬀs between eﬃciency losses from indirect tax imposi-
tion and stable tax revenue raising has long been a major real-world policy issue. This
is especially diﬃcult to resolve in developing countries, which have weak tax systems
and low taxable incomes and thus tend to rely heavily on trade taxes to raise revenues
to meet their fiscal demand. Figure 1 shows the clear downward trend in import tariﬀ
dependency along with per capita GDP, showing that many countries rely heavily on
customs and other import duties for their tax revenue.
Figure 1. Dependence on customs and other import duties in 2012
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(Source: World Development Indicators)
While being heavily dependent on tariﬀ revenues, developing countries began to
use value added taxes (VATs) in the 1990s (Ebrill et al., 2001). Crowe Horwath In-
ternational (2016) reports that all but six of the 54 countries in Africa levy VAT.
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Further, according to the International Monetary Fund (2011), VAT revenue has in-
creased over the past two decades, while trade tax revenue has declined in low-income,
lower middle-income, and upper middle-income countries. Nonetheless, import tar-
iﬀs still constitute a significant proportion of their tax revenues and cannot be fully
replaced with domestic taxes, especially in low-income countries.
The above-mentioned reality implies that the optimal tax structure of commodity
taxes and tariﬀs ought to be investigated with an explicit consideration of a revenue
constraint. However, most previous studies have investigated them separately. The
theory of optimal commodity taxation, which was initiated by Ramsey (1927), is to
find the tax structure that minimizes inevitable tax-induced price distortions subject
to a revenue constraint.1 Although the theory has been developed mainly in a closed
economy case by subsequent works such as Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b),
Dixit (1985) extends the optimal tax theory to the open-economy case.2 Hatta and
Ogawa (2007) examine the optimal tariﬀs for collecting revenue (without commodity
taxes) in a small open economy.3 These studies do not analyze the optimal tax mix
of commodity taxes and tariﬀs.
In addition to the optimal tax mix problem of commodity taxes and tariﬀs, this
study has another challenge, namely the incorporation of the manipulation of terms-
of-trade eﬀects into a revenue-constrained optimal tax framework. This is particularly
important for a large country (Kaldor, 1940; Johnson, 1953—54; Bond, 1990; Syropou-
los, 2002; Ogawa, 2007b, 2012). That is, tariﬀs are a device for a large country to
manipulate the terms of trade for exploiting monopoly power in trade, rather than for
revenue raising. As the terms-of-trade eﬀect complicates the problem, the optimal tax
problem under a revenue constraint and the optimal tariﬀ problem in a large country
have also been examined separately in most previous studies. As a notable exception,
Keen and Wildasin (2004) allow commodity taxes and tariﬀs to be adjusted coopera-
tively to achieve the global Pareto-eﬃcient allocation in a multicounty economy where
1Boadway (2012) provides a useful survey of the theory and policy in this field.
2Dixit (1985, Section 3.2) considers the case where the government directly manipulates consumer
and producer prices and all of the rent generated in the production side (i.e., producer price minus
world price) is shared by private producers. Hence, his model is not the revenue-constrained tax mix
of commodity taxes and tariﬀs.
3No terms-of-trade eﬀects are generated in their model since they consider a small open economy.
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each country has a distinct revenue constraint.4 In their framework, tariﬀs serve as
a device for transferring tax revenue across countries. Their tax coordination across
countries for the Pareto-eﬃcient allocation is fascinating in theory but practically dif-
ficult and empirically inconsistent with the reality. As Broda et al. (2008) show, for
example, the actual tariﬀ structure in the United States is consistent with the optimal
tariﬀ that exploits the terms-of-trade eﬀects rather than international coordination.
Allowing for this backdrop, we analyze the optimal indirect tax design jointly using
commodity taxes and tariﬀs for a tax-imposing country that arbitrarily acts only in
its own interest, in contrast to Keen and Wildasin (2004).
Our paper considers a small country case in which world prices are constant and
a large country case where the terms of trade can be manipulated, and compares the
optimal indirect tax structure between these two cases. We also analyze the con-
strained optimal indirect tax problem where the country optimizes only commodity
taxes while keeping tariﬀs at the given levels. This is because under the WTO regime,
the governments of developing countries may be unable to adjust import tariﬀs fully
and thus can use only commodity taxes as policy instruments. In these contexts,
we examine the optimal indirect tax policy not only as general as possible but also
numerically demonstrate the size of the possible gains by optimizing taxes and tar-
iﬀs, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and data for developing
countries.
By solving the truly comprehensive optimal tax combination problems for com-
modity taxes and tariﬀs, we find that even in an open economy, the optimal commodity
taxes follow the Ramsey tax rule originally derived in an optimal tax framework in
a closed economy and that the Ramsey tax rule holds consistently both in a small
and in a large country.5 They imply that the same policy implications for commodity
taxation hold across a wide range of situations. In addition, the optimal commodity
tax rules are found to be independent of the income eﬀects and the foreign country’s
substitution eﬀects. This finding can make our optimal tax design more practical.
In contrast to optimal commodity taxes, we find that the optimal tariﬀ vector
4Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), Keen and Ligthart (2002), and Emran and Stiglitz (2005) examine
tax and tariﬀ reforms jointly only for a small country but do not analyze the optimal tax problem.
5In this study, the Ramsey tax rule is not confined to the inverse elasticity rule, but rather
indicates the optimal commodity tax expression provided in Propositions 1 and 2 herein.
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takes diﬀerent forms in the small and large country cases. This implies that tariﬀ
policies should take the type of country into consideration. As an interesting and
suggestive result, we show that the optimal tariﬀs are not zero, but negative, in a
small country,6 despite commodity taxes being available. International institutions
such as the World Bank and WTO recommend tariﬀ reductions to raise the eﬃciency
of resource allocation. This finding supports their standard policy recommendation
of trade reform from positive to zero tariﬀs that achieve better welfare and a more
rapid transition to a free-trade regime.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our general
model of optimal indirect taxation. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the optimal taxation
in the small country and large country cases, respectively. We derive the general
rules of optimal indirect taxation by highlighting the sign of optimal taxes and tariﬀs
and the relative size of the optimal commodity tax rates and tariﬀ rates between
commodities. Section 5 numerically demonstrates the optimal indirect tax structure
and welfare gains through the optimal indirect taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We employ the framework of a general equilibriummodel of international trade. There
are N+1 tradable commodities, which are indexed as 0, 1, . . . , N , where commodity 0
denotes the numeraire. We consider commodity 0 to be an exported commodity and
non-numeraire commodities to be imported commodities. Production factors, fixed
in supply, are internationally immobile and fully utilized in production sectors. The
markets for commodities and factors are perfectly competitive. The home country
imposes commodity taxes and tariﬀs, without using a lump-sum tax and a profit tax,
to collect revenue, while the foreign country engages in free trade.
The home commodity taxes (t) and tariﬀs (τ ) imposed on the non-numeraire
6Developing counties often provide import subsidies for necessities such as gasoline in Iran and
barley in Saudi Arabia.
7Our numerical results, provided in Section 5 and the Appendix, show that free trade (zero
tariﬀs) enhances welfare in the small country case, compared with the status quo, even under a
revenue constraint.
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commodities are defined by
t ≡ q− p, τ ≡ p−w, (1)
where q, p, and w denote the home consumer, producer, and world price vectors of
non-numeraire commodities, respectively. We assume without loss of generality that
no tax or tariﬀ is imposed on the numeraire: t0 = τ 0 = 0. By setting w0 = 1, we have
q0 = p0 = w0 = 1.
In the home country, there is a representative consumer with a well-behaved utility
function. The expenditure function is given by e(q0,q, u, g), where u is the utility level
and g is a publicly provided good. The demand vector and substitution matrix for
the non-numeraire commodities are then given by eq(≡ ∂e/∂q) and eqq ≡ ∂eq/∂q0,
respectively, whose elements are ei(≡ ∂e/∂qi) and eij(≡ ∂ei/∂qj). Commodity i is
a substitute for commodity j in consumption if eij > 0. Let us denote eg ≡ ∂e/∂g
and eqg ≡ ∂eq/∂g, eu ≡ ∂e/∂u, and equ ≡ ∂eq/∂u. The expenditure function e(·)
has the following properties: (i) symmetry, eij = eji for all i, j; (ii) homogeneity,PN
i=0 qieji = 0 for all j; and (iii) negative semidefiniteness,
PN
i=0
PN
j=0 hihjeji = 0
if h = ζq for some scalar ζ and h0 ≡ (h0, h1, . . . , hn), and PNi=0PNj=0 hihjeji < 0
otherwise.8 Hereafter, q0 is not explicitly shown in e(·) because q0 = 1.
Given convex technology, the behavior of the production sectors is characterized
by a revenue function r(p0,p,v),9 where v is a factor endowment vector. The supply
vector and substitution matrix for the non-numeraire commodities are then given by
rp(≡ ∂r/∂p) and rpp ≡ ∂rp/∂p0, respectively, whose elements are ri(≡ ∂r/∂qi) and
rij(≡ ∂ri/∂qj). Commodity i is a substitute for commodity j in production if rij < 0.
The revenue function r(·) has the following properties: (i) symmetry, rij = rji for
all i, j; (ii) homogeneity,
PN
i=0 pirji = 0 for all j; and (iii) positive semidefiniteness,PN
i=0
PN
j=0 kikjrji = 0 if k = υk for some scalar υ and k0 ≡ (k0, k1, . . . , kn), andPN
i=0
PN
j=0 kikjrji > 0 otherwise.
10 Hereafter, p0 and v are not explicitly shown in
r(·) because p0 = 1 and each element of v is fixed.
8We assume that there is some substitutability between the numeraire and non-numeraire goods.
See Dixit and Norman (1980).
9See Dixit and Norman (1980) and Woodland (1982) for a revenue function.
10See Footnote 8.
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The budget constraint of the private sector in the home country is given by
e(q, u, g) = r(p), (2)
in which the left-hand side (LHS) represents the expenditure of the consumer and
the right-hand side (RHS) represents the income that the consumer receives, which is
equal to factor payments plus pure profits. As the revenue function is defined under
constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology, which leads to zero profit, or
under decreasing returns to scale (DRS) production technology, which yields positive
profit, equation (2) holds regardless of whether there is pure profit or no profit (Emran,
2005; Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). Because the equilibrium conditions including (2) and
the properties of the expenditure and revenue functions are the same under CRS and
DRS, our results hold regardless of whether there is pure profit or no profit.
Following Keen and Wildasin (2004), we assume that the government spends tax
revenue on the purchase of the numeraire commodity and provides it to the consumer
as a public good. The government budget constraint is
t0eq(q, u, g) + τ 0(eq(q, u, g)− rp(p)) ≥ g, (3)
where the first term on the LHS represents the commodity tax revenue and the second
term does the tariﬀ revenue.11 We assume that the public good is required at the
optimum.
The expenditure and revenue functions of the foreign country are given by e∗(w0,w, u∗)
and r∗(w0,w,v∗), where u∗ is the utility level of a representative consumer and v∗ is
the factor endowment vector in the foreign country. Let e∗q ≡ ∂e∗/∂w, e∗qq ≡ ∂e∗q/∂w0,
r∗p ≡ ∂r∗/∂w, r∗pp ≡ ∂r∗p/∂w0, e∗u ≡ ∂e∗/∂u∗, and e∗qu ≡ ∂e∗q/∂∂u∗. Hereafter, w0 is
not explicitly shown in e∗(·) and r∗(·) because w0 = 1, and v∗ is not explicitly shown
in r∗(·) because each element of v∗ is fixed.
The budget constraint of the private sector in the foreign country is
e∗(w, u∗) = r∗(w). (4)
11Equations (2) and (3) with equality yield the international trade balance: e0+ g− r0+w0(eq−
rp) = 0.
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The world market-clearing condition is
eq(q, u, g)− rp(p) + e∗q(w, u∗)− r∗p(w) = 0N . (5)
The market-clearing condition for commodity 0 is obtained byWalras’ law. Equations
(2) and (3) describe a small country and equations (2)—(5) describe a large country.
3 Optimal Indirect Taxes in a Small Country
This section examines the optimal indirect tax design in a small country facing con-
stant world prices. The government of the home country maximizes utility u subject
to equations (2) and (3). The utility maximization problem is given by12
max
t,  , g, u u, (6)
s.t. e(q, u, g)− r(p) = 0,
t0eq(q, u, g) + τ 0(eq(q, u, g)− rp(p)) = g.
3.1 Optimal Indirect Tax Solution
Solving the maximization problem (6) yields the optimal commodity taxes and tariﬀs
under the revenue constraint, which are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal commodity taxes and tariﬀs in a small country are given
by
t0 = −α(e0qe−1qq − r0pr−1pp), (7)
τ 0 = −αr0pr−1pp, (8)
where α ≡ (1 + eg)/(eg − e0qe−1qqeqg) > 0.13
12This particular formulation of the maximization problem is also used by Munk (1978), Hatta
and Ogawa (2007), and Ogawa (2012), among others.
13Assume that eqg = 0N (i.e., eg = e0g). Then, α−1 = 1/eg, in which 1/eg means the compensated
eﬀect of income on a public good.
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(See the Mathematical Appendix for the proof of Proposition 1.) Noting that e0qe
−1
qq
and −r0pr−1pp relate to the price distortions in consumption and production, respec-
tively and that a commodity tax imposes price distortion only on consumption and a
tariﬀ imposes price distortion on both consumption and production,14 we discuss the
intuition for Proposition 1. Roughly speaking, the optimal tariﬀs (8) are set allow-
ing only for price distortions on the production side because only tariﬀs yield price
distortions on the production side. The optimal commodity taxes (7) have to be set
allowing for not only the commodity tax-induced price distortions but also the opti-
mal tariﬀ structure, because both commodity taxes and tariﬀs yield price distortions
on the consumption side. This is confirmed by the fact that −αr0pr−1pp in the optimal
commodity taxes (7) represents the optimal tariﬀs. Thus, although the commodity
taxes do not yield price distortions in production, the substitution matrix of supply
appears in the optimal commodity taxes (7).
Ramsey (1927) and Munk (1978) provide the optimal commodity tax expression in
which the substitution terms of both demand and supply appear in a closed economy
with untaxed pure profits. The untaxed profits ensure that the supply side aﬀects
the optimal commodity taxes in their models. By contrast, our model shows that the
tariﬀs ensure that the supply side influences the optimal commodity taxes regardless of
whether there are pure profits under DRS or no profits under CRS. Incidentally, when
no tariﬀs are imposed, the optimal commodity taxes depend only on the consumption
side. This is analyzed in Section 3.3.
3.2 Optimal Tax Rules
This section examines the signs of the optimal commodity tax and tariﬀ rates as
well as the relative size of the optimal commodity tax rates and of the optimal tariﬀ
rates between commodities. We first determine the signs of the optimal commodity
taxes and tariﬀs under substitution conditions. Hatta (1977) shows that e−1qq < 0NN ,
where 0NN denotes the N ×N matrix of zeros, if all non-numeraire commodities are
substitutes in consumption and that r−1pp > 0NN if all non-numeraire commodities
are substitutes in production. Under these conditions, Proposition 1 shows that t >
14An import tariﬀ (subsidy) is equivalent to a production subsidy (tax) cum consumption tax
(subsidy).
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0N and τ < 0N . From the optimal commodity taxes (7) and tariﬀs (8), we find
that t + τ = −αe0qe−1qq > 0N under the aforementioned substitution condition in
consumption. These are summarized as follows.
Corollary 1(a). The optimal tax structure is such that (i) t + τ > 0N if all non-
numeraire commodities are substitutes for each other in consumption, (ii) τ < 0N
if all non-numeraire commodities are substitutes for each other in production, and
(iii) t > 0N if all non-numeraire commodities are substitutes for each other in both
consumption and production.
Corollary 1(a) shows that taxes, but not subsidies, are imposed on both consump-
tion and production under substitution conditions. Specifically, Corollary 1(a)—(i)
means the imposition of a tax on consumption and Corollary 1(a)—(ii) means an im-
port subsidy, which is equivalent to a production tax on the production side.15 If
τ > 0N , which means a combination of consumption taxes and production subsidies,
the required revenue must be collected from the taxes on consumption alone to meet
the fiscal demand. In this case, the economy has a smaller tax base, which naturally
leads to a larger tax distortion than when τ < 0N .
We can determine the sign of the average tax level on consumption and production
without substitution conditions for eqq and rpp.16 From the optimal tariﬀs (8), we
obtain
r0pτ = −τ
0rppτ
α < 0, (9)
where the inequality follows from α > 0 and property (iii) of the revenue function.
As τ i < (>)0 is equivalent to a production tax (subsidy) on the production side, (9)
implies that a positive tax is imposed on production on average. From the optimal
commodity taxes (7) and tariﬀs (8), we obtain
e0q(t+ τ ) = −(t+ τ )
0eqq(t+ τ )
α > 0, (10)
where the inequality follows from α > 0 and property (iii) of the expenditure function.
(10) shows that a positive tax is imposed on consumption on average.
15See Footnote 14.
16Following Ethier (1984) and Bond (1990), the tax revenue indicates an average sense of whether
the tax or subsidy is imposed at a higher dimension than the model with two goods.
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International institutions such as the World Bank and WTO recommend tariﬀ
reductions for many countries because they believe that free trade will be beneficial
for them. Our finding that the optimal tariﬀs under a revenue constraint are negative
implies that any positive tariﬀ would always create a larger price distortion than a
zero tariﬀ in a country facing a revenue constraint. This finding supports their stan-
dard policy recommendation of trade reform from positive to zero tariﬀs and a more
rapid transition to a free-trade regime. Our finding also recommends the reduction
of tariﬀs from zero to negative levels to improve welfare further. Although negative
tariﬀs may appear somewhat unrealistic or unconformable, they are equivalent to pos-
itive production taxes on the production side. Therefore, the optimal negative tariﬀs
can be replaced with positive production taxes if available. Section 5 numerically
demonstrates these optimal tax and tariﬀ rates in a real context and indicates the
magnitude of the welfare gains from optimal indirect taxation.
In addition to the signs of the optimal commodity tax and tariﬀ rates, we can
determine the relative size of the optimal commodity tax rates between commodities
and that of the optimal tariﬀ rate between commodities. For analytical tractability,
we assume that the taxed commodities are price independent, eij = rij = 0 for
i, j = 1, ..., N and i 6= j. Let us define the total tax rate on consumption, tariﬀ
rates, and commodity tax rate as δi ≡ (ti + τ i)/qi, φi ≡ τ i/pi, and γi ≡ ti/qi,
respectively. All tax rates defined here are expressed in terms of the tax-inclusive
price. Define the elasticities of compensated demand and supply as ηii ≡ qieii/ei and
σii ≡ pirii/ri, respectively. With these tax rate and elasticity definitions, from the
optimal commodity taxes (7) and tariﬀs (8), when eij = rij = 0 for i, j = 1, ..., N and
i 6= j we obtain the following equations that determine the ranking of the optimal
total tax, tariﬀ, and commodity tax rates:
δi = α−ηii , i = 1, . . . , N, (11)
−φi = ασii , i = 1, . . . , N, (12)
γi − γj =
µ
1
−ηii −
1
−ηjj
¶
Ω+
µ
1
σii −
1
σjj
¶
Θ, i, j = 1, . . . , N, (13)
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where Ω ≡ 11
α +
1
σjj
> 0, Θ ≡
1
α +
1
ηii³
1
α +
1
σii
´³
1
α +
1
σjj
´ > 0.
(See the Mathematical Appendix for these derivations.) (11) shows that the relative
size of the optimal total tax rates is associated with the relative size of demand
elasticity: δi Q δj if −ηii R −ηjj. This is a standard inverse elasticity rule applied to
the optimal total tax rates on consumption. Similarly, (12) shows that the relative size
of the optimal tariﬀ rates is associated with the relative size of supply elasticity: −φi Q
−φj if σii R σjj. Notably, this implies that the optimal tariﬀ structure is independent
of the information on the consumption side, although tariﬀs impose price distortions
on production as well as consumption. From (13), we see that γi < γj if −ηii ≥ −ηjj
and σii ≥ σjj with at least one strict inequality. That is, the ranking of the optimal
commodity tax rates depends on the elasticities of supply and compensated demand.
These results are summarized as follows.
Corollary 1(b). The following optimal tax rules hold: (i) when eij = 0 for i, j =
1, . . . , N and i 6= j, δi Q δj if −ηii R −ηjj, (ii) when rij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N and
i 6= j, −φi Q −φj if σii R σjj, and (iii) when eij = rij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N and
i 6= j, γi < γj if −ηii ≥ −ηjj and σii ≥ σjj with at least one strict inequality.
The assumption that there are no cross-substitution eﬀects between the taxed
goods may appear somewhat strong, and with it, we may neglect an important re-
lation between the cross-substitution eﬀects and optimal tax structure. Thus, we
consider the case where there are cross-substitution eﬀects between commodities. Ex-
amining the optimal tax rules in the presence of cross-substitution eﬀects leads to
undue analytical complexity. Following previous studies of optimal tax theory (Har-
berger, 1964; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971b), we thus consider a three-good model to
avoid such complexity.17 In a three-good case, from the optimal commodity taxes (7)
17No studies have theoretically derived the optimal tax rules concerning the relative size of com-
modity tax rates in a model with more than three goods and cross-substitution eﬀects. As an
exception, Ogawa (2007a) considers a four-good model with cross-substitution eﬀects to investigate
the relative size of the optimal commodity tax rates. However, he does not determine relative tax
rates for all commodities. In Section 5, we numerically demonstrate the optimal commodity tax
rates in the six-sector model with cross-substitution eﬀects, which is a more general case than the
cases treated in Corollary 1 (b) and (c).
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and tariﬀs (8), we obtain
δ1 − δ2 = (η20 − η10)Ψ, (14)
(−φ1)− (−φ2) = [(−σ20)− (−σ10)]Λ, (15)
γ1 − γ2 =
µ
p1
w1
¶½
(η20 − η10)Ψ+ [(−σ20)− (−σ10)]
µΛp2
q2
¶¾
, (16)
where Ψ ≡ αe1e2
(e11e22 − e12e21)q1q2 > 0, Λ ≡
αr1r2
(r11r22 − r12r21)p1p2 > 0.
(See the Mathematical Appendix for these derivations.) These equations show the
following Corlett—Hague optimal tax rules applied to a small open economy.18
Corollary 1(c). The optimal tax structure in a three-good case is such that (i) δ1 R
δ2 if η20 R η10, (ii) −φ1 R −φ2 if −σ20 R −σ10, and (iii) γi > γj if ηj0 ≥ ηi0 and
−σj0 ≥ −σi0 with at least one strict inequality.
Corollary 1(c)-(i) is the Corlett—Hague rule, which is originally derived in the
context of an optimal commodity tax problem, applied to the total tax rate on con-
sumption δi, comprising the commodity tax and tariﬀ. Taxation on the consumption
of the two non-numeraire commodities creates an incentive for the overconsumption
of the untaxed commodity (i.e., the numeraire commodity 0). However, by imposing a
higher tax rate on the consumption of the commodity with less substitutability for the
untaxed commodity and a lower tax rate on the other non-numeraire commodity, we
can partially repress the incentive for the overconsumption of the untaxed commodity
(Corlett and Hague, 1953). Corollary 1(c)-(ii) is the Corlett—Hague rule for the opti-
mal tariﬀ rates, and its intuition is analogous to that for Corollary 1(c)-(i). Corollary
1(c)-(iii) is the generalized Corlett—Hague rule for the optimal commodity taxation
that must allow for the production side. The relative commodity tax rates between
commodities depend on the cross-price elasticities of both compensated demand and
supply.
18The Corlett—Hague rule is well known as the general determination rule for the relative size of the
optimal tax rates in the presence of cross-substitution eﬀects. Corlett and Hague (1953) show that
in a closed economy with three goods where commodity tax rates are initially uniform, increasing
the tax rate on the good that is less substitutable for leisure and decreasing the tax rate on the other
good enhances welfare. The Corlett—Hague result is derived in the context of an optimal commodity
tax framework by Harberger (1964), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b), and Ogawa (2007a).
12
3.3 Constrained Optimum
In this section, we examine the optimal commodity taxes in a case where tariﬀs are
not fully adjustable. This case typically arises under the WTO regime, under which
countries cannot newly impose or raise tariﬀs in principle. This situation can be
described by the maximization problem (6), except that the government takes the
tariﬀs as given. Analogously to Proposition 1, we obtain the optimal taxes t under
the given τ as follows:
t0 = −αe0qe−1qq − τ 0. (17)
(See the Mathematical Appendix for this derivation). This provides further insights
into the optimal commodity tax in an open economy. If τ = 0N , we obtain a standard
Ramsey tax expression t0 = −αe0qe−1qq, which is derived in a closed economy with zero
profit or with a 100% profit tax. When we depart from this special case with zero
tariﬀs, the optimal commodity tax ti is scaled down (up) in accordance with the given
tariﬀ level τ i when τ i > (<)0.
If tariﬀs are optimally set, the optimal commodity taxes (17) yield the same levels
of the optimal commodity taxes implied by (7). Since the tariﬀs in (17) are not
necessarily set at the optimal level, the tax structure (17) worsens welfare compared
with the tax structure of (7) and (8). Despite this ineﬃciency, this constrained optimal
tax structure has a practical advantage, namely the optimal tax can be determined
only by the elasticities of compensated demand and observed tariﬀ rates, without
information about the production side. In Section 5, we numerically demonstrate the
optimal commodity tax rates under τ = 0N and welfare gains compared with the
status quo.
4 Optimal Indirect Taxes in a Large Country
In a large country, the government takes account of two other constraints than those
in (6): the private sector’s budget constraint in the foreign country (4) and the world
market-clearing condition (5). The utility maximization problem in a large country
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is given by
max
t,  , w, g, u, u∗ u, (18)
s.t. e(q, u, g)− r(p) + L = 0,
t0eq(q, u, g) + τ 0(eq(q, u, g)− rp(p)) + L = g,
e∗(w, u∗)− r∗(w) = 0,
eq(q, u, g)− rp(p) + e∗q(w, u∗)− r∗p(w) = 0N .
This maximization problem introduces a lump-sum tax L into the private sector’s
budget constraint in the home country (2) and the government revenue constraint
(3) as a device to compare our revenue-constrained optimal tariﬀs with the optimal
tariﬀs that maximize welfare by improving the terms of trade. The latter is the
celebrated optimal tariﬀs in the context of the international trade literature (Kaldor,
1940; Johnson, 1953—54; Bond, 1990).19 Note that when this device cannot be used
by the government, we ignore the first-order condition (FOC) with respect to L for
the welfare maximization (18).
4.1 Optimal Indirect Tax Solution
Without the use of a lump-sum tax L, solving the problem (18) yields the optimal
commodity taxes and tariﬀs under a revenue constraint in a large country, which are
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal commodity taxes and tariﬀs in a large country are given
by
t0 = −α(e0qe−1qq − r0pr−1pp), (19)
τ 0 = −αr0pr−1pp + θ0, (20)
19Optimal tariﬀ theory does not require the government to raise tariﬀ revenues for public goods
provision but reimburse the tariﬀ revenues to the household in a lump-sum fashion.
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where α ≡ (1 + eg)/(eg − e0qe−1qqeqg), and
θ0 ≡
∙
e∗u
e∗u − (e∗q − r∗p)0(e∗qq − r∗pp)−1e∗qu
¸
(e∗q − r∗p)0(e∗qq − r∗pp)−1. (21)
(See the Mathematical Appendix for the proof of Proposition 2.) The important
finding of this proposition is that the optimal commodity tax expression in the large
country (19) is the same as that in the small country (7). This finding leads to
there being no diﬀerence in the optimal commodity tax rules between small and large
countries, as discussed below. It should also be apparent from (19) that a requirement
for the government to estimate the optimal commodity taxes is information about the
domestic substitution terms of demand eij, of supply rij, and those between public
and private goods eig, other than the visible domestic demand and supply levels. That
is, there is no need to assess the income eﬀects and a foreign country’s substitution
terms. This is a practical advantage for policymakers when they estimate the optimal
commodity taxes.
The optimal tariﬀ expression in a large country (20) consists of −αr0pr−1pp and θ0.
The former is nothing but the optimal tariﬀ expression in a small country and hence
reflects the price distortion eﬀects in production generated by the revenue constraint.
The latter θ0 represents the optimal tariﬀs that maximize welfare by improving the
terms of trade. This is confirmed by employing lump-sum tax L, that is, by considering
the no revenue constraint case. If we allow the use of lump-sum tax L in this economy,
the optimal commodity tax and tariﬀ can be expressed by
t = 0N , τ = θ. (22)
(See the Mathematical Appendix for this derivation.) The second equation in (22) is
the optimal tariﬀ expression that maximizes welfare by improving the terms of trade
(Bond, 1990; Ogawa, 2007b).
Before proceeding further, let us examine the sign of α for a large country. There
is no guarantee that α is positive in the large country case in contrast to the small
country case. Applying some manipulations to the optimal commodity taxes (19) and
tariﬀs (20) and making use of the government budget constraint (3) with the equality
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yield
−(t+ τ − θ)0eqq(t+ τ − θ) + (τ − θ)0rpp(τ − θ) = α[g − θ0(eq − rp)] > 0, (23)
where the inequality follows from property (iii) of the expenditure and revenue func-
tions. (See the Mathematical Appendix for the derivation of (23).) The term θ0(eq−
rp) represents the revenue from the optimal tariﬀs that maximize welfare with the
terms-of-trade eﬀects. The sign of the expression in the square brackets in (23) is am-
biguous, and so is the sign of α. We thus make the following assumption to determine
the sign of α.
Assumption. g > θ0(eq − rp).
This assumption means that the required tax revenue must exceed the revenue
from the optimal tariﬀs that maximize welfare through the manipulation of the terms
of trade. Under this assumption, α > 0 from (23).
4.2 Optimal Tax Rules
Since the optimal commodity tax expression in the large country (19) is the same as
that in the small country (7), we expect that the optimal commodity tax rules are the
same as those in the small country case. This expectation is indeed true, although a
complex proof is needed. (See the Mathematical Appendix for the proof of Corollary
2.)
Corollary 2. Suppose that the assumption is satisfied. Then, the following optimal
commodity tax rules hold in a large country: (i) t > 0N if all commodities are sub-
stitutes for each other in both consumption and production; (ii) when eij = rij = 0
for i, j = 1, . . . , N and i 6= j, γi < γj if −ηii ≥ −ηjj and σii ≥ σjj with at least one
strict inequality; and (iii) in the three-commodity case, when taxed commodities are
substitutes for each other in production, γi < γj if ηj0 ≤ ηi0 and −σj0 ≤ −σi0 with at
least one strict inequality.
The qualitative results for the optimal commodity taxes are the same in the small
and large country cases. The relative size of the optimal commodity tax rates depends
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on that of the elasticities of the home country, but not on the foreign country’s
elasticities. While Corollary 2 for a large country with the terms-of-trade eﬀect as
well as Corollary 1(c) for a small country are limited to the three-good case or the
case with no cross-substitution eﬀects for analytical tractability, more general cases
(six sectors) are numerically demonstrated in Section 5.
The optimal tariﬀ expression (20) implies that non-zero tariﬀs are required at
the optimum because it is not generally the case that αr0pr−1pp = θ0. The sign of the
optimal tariﬀ on commodity i is ambiguous in general. However, the sign turns out
to be positive if the impact of tariﬀs on the terms of trade is greater than the price
distortion eﬀects generated by a revenue constraint, namely αr0pr−1ppς < θi, where θi
is the i-th element in θ and ς is the n-dimensional vector whose i-th element is 1 and
whose other elements are zero. Our numerical analysis in Section 5 shows that the
signs of the optimal tariﬀs in the larger country case are positive for most categories.
4.3 Constrained Optimum
Just as examined in Section 3.3 for a small country, we consider the case where tariﬀs
are not fully adjustable in a large country. Its maximization problem is the same as
(18), except that the government takes the tariﬀs as given. Analogously to Proposition
2, we obtain the optimal taxes t under the given τ as
t0 = −αe0qe−1qq − τ 0 + θ0. (24)
(See the Mathematical Appendix for this derivation.) The expression (24) shows that
the optimal commodity tax ti is scaled down (up) in accordance with the given tariﬀ
level τ i from the Ramsey tax when τ i > (<)0 and scaled up (down) in accordance
with θi when θi > (<)0. Even if τ = 0N , the optimal commodity taxes must allow
for not only the Ramsey taxes −αe0qe−1qq but also the terms-of-trade eﬀects θ. In
this case, the domestic commodity tax must collect the required tax revenue while
manipulating the terms of trade.
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5 Numerical Example
5.1 A Numerical General Equilibrium Model
To numerically illustrate some of the optimal tax rules shown in Propositions 1 and 2
and indicate the welfare gains under the optimal tariﬀs and taxes, we develop single-
country CGE models for small and large countries and compute the combinations of
the optimal commodity taxes and import tariﬀs. The models are developed based on
the standard CGE model by Hosoe et al. (2010) with some modifications (discussed
later). The standard CGE model consists of nested-constant elasticity of substitu-
tion/transformation (CES/CET) functions, which describe the substitution between
goods in production and consumption (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Description of Substitution between Commodities
  
(4) Composite good 
production function 
(CES) 
Utility 
Composite Good
Intermediate Value Added
ExportsImports Domestic Good
Domestic Output
(2) Gross domestic 
output production 
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(CES) 
(6) Utility 
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(3) Transformation 
function (CET) 
Consumption Consumption
(5) Composite good 
market equilibrium
Unskilled LaborCapital 
Gov. Cons. Investment Intermediate
Skilled Labor
Source: Hosoe et al. (2010, Figure 6.1), modified by the authors.
The models distinguish six sectors (agriculture, mining, light and heavy manufac-
turing, transportation, and other services) and are calibrated to data of Côte d’Ivoire
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and the elasticity of substitution/transformation for Armington’s (1969) composite
good, provided by the GTAP database version 9a (Hertel, 1997). We conduct the
same experiments for Madagascar and India in the Appendix. Their results are qual-
itatively similar to those for Côte d’Ivoire. The revenue for these countries depends
strongly on tariﬀ revenue. The ratio of tariﬀ revenue to tax revenue and tariﬀ rates
for these countries are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The Ratio of Tariﬀ Revenue and Average Tariﬀ Rates
Countries Côte d’Ivoire Madagascar India
The Ratio of Tariﬀ Revenue (in 2002)
Average Tariﬀ Rate
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
46.3%
6.6%
0.2%
11.9%
8.8%
0%
0%
49.3%
5.3%
3.2%
8.6%
5.9%
0%
0%
17.8%
16%
1.5%
26.6%
7.5%
0%
0%
Source: GTAP Data base version 9a
While the standard CGE model assumes ad valorem import tariﬀs, we use ad
quantum tariﬀs, following the specification in the theoretical part. We newly equip
the model with ad quantum commodity taxes, imposed on the consumption of Arm-
ington’s composite good, which are used for household and government consumption,
investment, and intermediate. For simplicity, we fix government consumption and
investment at the initial level. Other than these two taxes, the model has a produc-
tion tax, a factor input tax, and an export tax; their tax rates are kept unchanged.20
In the small country model, international prices are constant. For the large country
model, we assume a downward-sloping export good demand curve and an upward-
20Our numerical results show that negative tariﬀs (which are identical to the production taxes and
consumption subsidies) should be imposed on most categories even if production taxes are imposed.
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sloping import good supply curve. They are characterized by price elasticities, which
are approximately equal to the elasticities of transformation/substitution provided by
the GTAP database (Hosoe et al., 2010, Ch. 10). Given this setup, the commodity
tax and/or import tariﬀ rates are adjusted to maximize household utility subject to
the government budget constraint, which allows the government to aﬀord to maintain
its consumption level at the status quo.
5.2 Application to Côte d’Ivoire
The optimal commodity tax and tariﬀ structure and welfare impacts in the small
country case are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively and those in the large country
case are given in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. We optimize (i) the commodity taxes
with zero tariﬀs and (ii) both the commodity taxes and the tariﬀs in the small and
large country cases. The optimal commodity taxes with zero tariﬀs would indeed
improve welfare compared with the status quo under the import tariﬀs shown in
Table 1 (Table 3-(i)), as free trade advocates expect. When we further optimize the
import tariﬀ as well as the commodity tax, the optimized tariﬀs become negative for
most categories (Table 2-(ii)), as predicted by Corollary 1(a).21 The joint optimization
of tariﬀs and taxes would nearly double the welfare gains (Table 3).
21Strictly speaking, our numerical CGE model slightly diﬀers from our theoretical model. In the
theoretical model, commodity taxation on a commodity creates the incentive for the overconsump-
tion of other commodities, as discussed in the interpretation of Corollary 1(c). In our CGE model, it
creates the incentive not only for the overconsumption but also for the overuse of its intermediate in-
put. In addition, although our CGE model is a six-sector model, it is made of CES/CET functions for
practical model estimation by the calibration method and thus cannot assume no cross-substitution
eﬀects as in Corollary 1(b). Therefore, in our numerical examples, we do not demonstrate the op-
timal tax ranking but focus on demonstrating the sign of the optimal tariﬀs in a small and a large
country and the welfare impacts of the tax and tariﬀ optimization.
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Table 2. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Small Country Case
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 0.136
0 0.264
0 0.114
0 −0.01
0 0.076
0 −0.185
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
−0.141 0.121
0.152 0.228
−0.251 0.165
−0.061 −0.015
−0.22 0.120
−0.201 −0.121
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
Table 3. Impact on Welfare in the Small Country Case
(Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax 0.00843
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.01418
By contrast, the optimal tariﬀs in the large country case turn positive for all
categories (Table 4-(ii)) because positive tariﬀs can improve the terms of trade to
gain more than the loss from the price distortion eﬀect as discussed in Section 4.
In contrast to the small country case, commodity tax optimization with zero tariﬀs
would deteriorate welfare slightly because the zero tariﬀs lose exploiting rents from
abroad under the initial tariﬀs (Table 5-(i)). The joint optimization of both taxes and
tariﬀs would improve welfare (Table 5-(ii)).
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Table 4. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Large Country Case
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 0.013
0 0.034
0 0.119
0 0.071
0 0.090
0 −0.101
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0.340 −0.055
0.427 −0.638
0.269 0.011
0.222 0.058
0.309 0.011
0.325 −0.065
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
Table 5. Impact on Welfare in the Large Country Case
(Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax −0.00109
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.01504
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the optimal mix of commodity taxes and tariﬀs under a revenue
constraint in an open economy. The optimal commodity taxes and tariﬀs create an
interaction for each other via the common tax base of consumption and the terms-
of-trade eﬀects. This led us to expect the optimal tax structure under a revenue
constraint to be complex. This study, however, provides simple and intuitive expres-
sions for the optimal commodity tax and tariﬀ vectors. They help us understand the
structure and properties that can make tax policymaking practical.
In particular, we obtain a robust result that the optimal commodity taxes follow
the Ramsey rule relating to the elasticities of compensated demand and supply. This
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finding is consistent with the Ramsey rule in a closed economy, and the rule holds
regardless of whether a country is small or large. The Ramsey rule is likely to hold
across a wide range of situations. By contrast, the optimal tariﬀs take diﬀerent forms,
which depend crucially on the country’s size (small or large). This result implies
that tariﬀ policies should take the type of country and domestic commodity taxation
system into consideration.
In this study, we examine optimal taxes and tariﬀs in the context of less devel-
oped countries, where few tax policy options are available. As those countries grow,
however, more policy devices become available for them, such as corporate tax and
labor income tax. These devices could be examined in future research.
Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By using (1), the problem (6) yields the FOCs with respect to t, τ , g, and u:
−μe0q − λ(e0q + t0eqq + τ 0eqq) = 00N , (A1)
−μ(e0q − r0p)− λ[e0q − r0p + t0eqq + τ 0 (eqq − rpp)] = 00N , (A2)
−μeg − λ (t0eqg + τ 0eqg − 1) = 0, (A3)
1− μeu − λ(t0 + τ 0)equ = 0, (A4)
where μ and λ are Lagrange multipliers. From (A1), we have
t0 + τ 0 = −
³
1 +
μ
λ
´
e0qe
−1
qq . (A5)
From (A1) and (A2), we obtain
τ 0 = −
³
1 +
μ
λ
´
r0pr
−1
pp. (A6)
From (A3) and (A5), we obtain
1 +
μ
λ =
1 + eg
eg − e0qe−1qqeqg . (A7)
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We finally obtain the optimal commodity tax expression (7) from (A5)—(A7) and the
optimal tariﬀ expression (8) from (A6) and (A7).22
Multiplying (A5) by eqq (t+ τ ) and (A6) by rppτ , adding up the results, and
making use of (3) with the equality and (A7) yields
−(t+ τ )0eqq(t+ τ ) + τ 0rppτ = αg.
The LHS is positive from property (iii) of the expenditure and revenue functions.
Thus, α > 0 since g > 0.
Derivations of (11), (12), and (13)
When eij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N , using the definitions of tax rates and elasticities,
(A5) leads to (11). When rij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N , using the definitions of tax rates
and elasticities, (A6) leads to (12).
When eij = rij = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N and i 6= j, from (7) we have
γi = α
∙
− 1ηii + (1− γi)
1
σii
¸
,
where we use pi/qi = 1− γi. Solving this equation with respect to γi yields
γi =
µ
1
−ηii +
1
σii
¶Áµ
1
α +
1
σii
¶
. (A8)
After some manipulation, (A8) leads to (13). As α > 0 and σii > 0 for i = 1, . . . , N ,
we have Ω > 0. From (A8) and the fact that pi/qi = 1− γi, it follows that
1
α +
1
ηii =
pi
qi
µ
1
α +
1
σii
¶
> 0, (A9)
where the inequality follows from α > 0 and σii > 0. (A9), together with σii > 0 and
α > 0, proves that Θ > 0.
22The FOC (A4) does not aﬀect the optimal tax and tariﬀ expressions in Proposition 1. From
(A4), we find that μ = [1− λ(t+ τ )0equ] /eu, which shows that μ is the social marginal utility of
income (Diamond, 1975, Equation 6, p. 338).
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Derivations of (14), (15), and (16)
In the three-good case, using the definitions of tax rates and elasticities, (A5) is
reduced to δi = (−ηjj + ηij)Ψ for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Since ηj0 + ηjj + ηji = 0 for
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j,23 this can be rewritten as
δ1 = (η20 + η12 + η21)Ψ, δ2 = (η10 + η12 + η21)Ψ,
which yields (14). The positivity of Ψ follows from property (iii) of the expenditure
function.
By using the definitions of tax rates and elasticities, from (5) we find that φi =
(−σjj+σij)Λ. Since σj0+σjj+σji = 0 for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j,24 this can be rewritten
as
−φ1 = −(σ20 + σ12 + σ21)Λ, φ2 = −(σ10 + σ12 + σ21)Λ,
which yields (15). The positivity of Λ follows from property (iii) of the revenue
function.
From the definitions of γi and φi, we obtain δi = ti/qi + (pi/qi)(τ i/pi). From this
and pi/qi = 1 − γi, we have δi = (1 − φi)γi + φi. By using this, (14), and (15), we
obtain (16).
Derivation of (17)
Since the tariﬀs are taken at a given level, we ignore the FOC (A2). From (A5) and
(A7), we obtain (17).
Proof of Proposition 2
By using the definition of commodity taxes and tariﬀs (1), we can write the FOCs of
the maximization problem (18) as follows.
−μe0q − λ(e0q + t0eqq + τ 0eqq)−ψ0eqq = 00N , (A10)
−μ ¡e0q − r0p¢− λ £e0q − r0p + t0eqq + τ 0 (eqq − rpp)¤)−ψ0 (eqq − rpp) = 00N , (A11)
23This follows from property (ii) of the expenditure function.
24This follows from property (ii) of the revenue function.
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−π(e∗q − r∗p)0 + λ(eq − rp)0 −ψ0(e∗qq − r∗pp) = 00N , (A12)
−μ− λ = 0, (A13)
−μeg − λ (t0eqg + τ 0eqg − 1)−ψ0eqg = 0, (A14)
1− μeu − λ(t0 + τ 0)equ −ψ0equ = 0, (A15)
−πe∗u −ψ0e∗qu = 0, (A16)
where μ, λ, π, and ψ0 ≡ (ψ1, . . . ,ψN) are Lagrange multipliers. Note that we ignore
the FOC with respect to L (A13) because the lump-sum tax is not used in the proof
of Proposition 2.
From (A10), we have
−t0 − τ 0 − ψ
0
λ =
³
1 +
μ
λ
´
e0qe
−1
qq . (A17)
From (A10) and (A11), we obtain
−τ 0 − ψ
0
λ =
³
1 +
μ
λ
´
r0pr
−1
pp. (A18)
From (A14) and (A17), we obtain
1 +
μ
λ =
1 + eg
eg − e0qe−1qqeqg . (A19)
By using (5), (A12) leads to
−ψ
0
λ =
³
1 +
π
λ
´
(e∗q − r∗p)0(e∗qq − r∗pp)−1. (A20)
From (A16) and (A20), we obtain
1 +
π
λ =
e∗u
e∗u − (e∗q − r∗p)0(e∗qq − r∗pp)−1e∗qu . (A21)
By combining (A17)—(A19), we obtain the optimal commodity tax expression (19),
and with (A18)—(A21), we obtain the tariﬀ expression (20).25
25The FOC (A15) does not aﬀect the optimal tax and tariﬀ expressions (19) and (20). From (A15),
we find that μ = [1− λ(t+ τ )0equ + λθ0equ]/eu, which shows that μ is the social marginal utility of
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Derivation of (22)
By applying the FOC (A13) to (A17) and (A18), we obtain the first equation in (22)
from (A17) and (A18) and the second equation from (A18), (A20), and (A21).
Derivation of (23)
From the optimal tariﬀ expression (20), we obtain −αr0pr−1pp = τ 0−θ0. By substituting
this equation into −αr0pr−1pp in the optimal commodity tax expression (19), we find
that −(t + τ − θ)0eqq = αe0q. The optimal tariﬀ expression immediately yields
(τ−θ)0rpp = −αr0p. Multiplying the former by (t+ τ − θ) and the latter by (τ − θ),
adding up the results, and making use of the government budget constraint (3) with
the equality yields (23).
Proof of Corollary 2
By applying the proofs of Corollaries 1(a)-(iii) and (b)-(iii), we can immediately prove
Corollaries 2-(i) and 2-(ii), respectively. The proof of Corollary 2-(iii) is as follows.
From (A17) and (A19)—(A21), we find that κi = (−ηjj + ηij)Ψ for i, j = 1, 2 and
i 6= j, where κi ≡ (ti + τ i − θi)/qi and θi is the i-th element in θ. By using this and
ηj0 + ηjj + ηji = 0, we obtain
κ1 − κ2 = (η20 − η10)Ψ. (A22)
From (A18)—(A21), we obtain
νi = (−σjj + σij)Ψ, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, (A23)
where νi ≡ (τ i − θi)/pi. This and σj0 + σjj + σji = 0 lead to
(−ν1)− (−ν2) = [(−σ20)− (−σ10)]Λ. (A24)
From the definitions of κi, γi, and νi, we obtain κi = γi+(1−γi)νi. This equation,
income in a country with monopoly power in trade. The last term on the RHS is the welfare impact
through the terms-of-trade eﬀects.
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(A22), and (A24) yield
(γ1 − γ2)(1− ν2) = (η20 − η10)Ψ+ [(−σ20)− (−σ10)](Λp1/q1). (A25)
As α > 0 from the assumption, Ψ > 0 and Λ > 0 hold. It follows from (A23) that
νi < 0 as σij < 0 from the substitution condition between the taxed commodities.
Thus, 1− νi > 0.26 As 1− γi > 0, 1− νi > 0, Ψ > 0, and Λ > 0, (A25) proves (iii).
Derivation of (24)
Since the tariﬀs are taken at a given level, we ignore the FOC (A11). From (A17)
and (A19)—(A21), we obtain (24).
Appendix: Numerical Examples for Other Coun-
tries
We carry out the same numerical experiments for Madagascar and India that we did
for Côte d’Ivoire in Section 5. Tables 6 and 10 show that their optimal tariﬀs in a
small country case are consistently negative for most categories in Madagascar and
India, as we find for Côte d’Ivoire in Table 2. Tables 8 and 12 consistently show that
the optimal tariﬀs in a large country turn positive for all categories. Tables 7, 9, 11,
and 13 show that, in the small and large country cases, welfare would be improved by
commodity tax optimization and further by the joint optimization of both taxes and
tariﬀs. In contrast to the results of the Côte d’Ivoire case, in the large country case of
Madagascar and India, welfare would be improved by commodity tax optimization.
This result implies that the initial tariﬀs in Madagascar and India would be far from
the optimal tariﬀ structure that improves the terms-of-trade eﬀects.
26This substitution condition in production, which is not required to prove Corollary 1(c)-(iii), is
used to satisfy 1− νi > 0.
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Application to Madagascar
Table 6. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Small Country Case for Madagascar
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 0.069
0 0.000
0 0.001
0 0.069
0 −0.004
0 −0.105
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
−0.132 0.028
0.046 0.000
−0.201 0.048
−0.22 0.053
−0.253 0.071
−0.224 0.015
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
Table 7. Impact on Welfare in the Small Country Case for Madagascar
(Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax 0.01871
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.02729
Table 8. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Large Country Case for Madagascar
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 −0.048
0 0.000
0 0.043
0 0.013
0 0.063
0 0.015
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0.246 −0.043
0.339 0.000
0.146 0.020
0.117 0.016
0.172 0.028
0.190 −0.030
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
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Table 9. Impact on Welfare in the Small Country Case for Madagascar
(Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax 0.00075
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.00416
Application to India
Table 10. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Small Country Case for India
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 −0.232
0 −0.219
0 0.026
0 0.008
0 0.025
0 0.092
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0.223 −0.257
0.174 0.000
−0.013 0.019
−0.110 0.107
−0.004 0.015
−0.105 0.104
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
Table 11. Impact on Welfare in the Small Country Case for India
(Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax 0.00394
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.01130
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Table 12. Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax Structure in the Large Country Case for India
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax (ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax
Sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Light Manufacturing
Heavy Manufacturing
Transportation
Service
Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0 −0.258
0 −0.068
0 0.043
0 0.027
0 0.017
0 0.062
Optimal Tariﬀ Rate Optimal Tax Rate
0.513 −0.321
0.422 0.000
0.337 −0.008
0.213 0.119
0.383 −0.021
0.329 0.057
Note: The tariﬀ and tax rates are expressed by the ad quantum tax rate
divided by the tax-inclusive price as defined in Section 3.2
Table 13. Impact on Welfare in the Large Country Case for India
Change from the Base in Equivalent Variations [% of GDP])
(i) Zero Tariﬀ and Optimal Tax 0.00117
(ii) Optimal Tariﬀ and Tax 0.01394
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